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Landscapes in Time: 
A Psychotherapeutic Intervention 
 
By Emma Rose and Neil Boynton 
 
This paper develops aesthetic and theoretical concepts that underpin a film made by the authors. 
The paper draws together a range of disciplines, well-established theories of art and culture, 
philosophy and aesthetics, clinical psychology, psychoanalysis, and practices associated with 
psychotherapy. In particular, the paper is informed by new concepts of mentalisation in 
psychoanalytic theory (Fonagy 1991), cognitive psychology (Morton and Frith 1995) and mentalising 
in practice (Allen 2006). These ideas can lead to the development of a more intense empathic 
connection between the self and others, and the self and nature.  
 
The film presents digital footage captured by cameras positioned in the snow-capped peaks of the 
French Alps over a period of four months. The cameras were placed in three different positions: one 
in an alpine rescue hut, another mounted on the tallest apartment block in the ski station, and the 
other in the valley of a high mountain village. Each was placed in order to give different perspectives 
on one mountain range, providing an experience that could not be achieved by a single geographical 






The cameras, set to shoot at 30-second intervals, enable the viewer to experience the landscape 
over a longer period than is normally possible. Thus, the film presents images outside our normal 
perception of scale and time; an experience heightened by its projection across the full size of three 
walls of a gallery space creating for the viewer, an immersive environment. The size of the landscape 
and the length of time captured are perhaps difficult to grasp but comprehensible. The time-lapse 
technology allows observation of variations in landscape scenes, from different times of day and 
night, and contrasting weather conditions. The typical visitor would not see such a wide range of 
environmental elements during any one visit. Geography and time are used to mediate the viewer’s 
experience. 
 
In selecting the winter Alps as a location we confront subject matter framed by and for the tourist’s 
eye. The tourist is the owner of the ‘gaze’, which as Urry says, ‘orders and regulates the relationship 
with the tourist environment, demarcating the “other” and identifying the “out-of-the-ordinary”’ 
(Urry 2002). Urry argues that the tourist looking in this case at the landscape, seeks out the familiar 
known ‘sign’ of what is typical of an ‘other’; the extraordinary, the picturesque, the iconic, forms of 
grandiosity and monumentality, modes of ‘otherness’, in all its forms. These are the spectatorial 
requirements of a tourist, captured in photographs and sent to family and friends via camera-phones 
and in postcards. These are visual experiences acknowledged as necessary to invest a holiday with 
meaning, to paraphrase Urry, to satisfy the needs of ‘being away’, and to experience the ‘otherness’ 
of home and work. The tourist viewing the landscape renders the mountain environment as a 
spectacle, a set of remarkable images, experienced in a certain way. This is not to suggest that all 
visitors to a mountain area see in the same way. The skier surveys a slope differently from the hiker 
or the photographer. Seasonal workers and permanent residents will also have their own slants. The 
key point here is that when the mountain regions of the Alps are viewed as a landscape, as a natural 
spectacle, such viewing is strongly shaped by typical viewing patterns.  
Although we appreciate the importance of historical and aesthetic interpretations of how a 
landscape might be viewed -the picturesque, the sublime, or the romantic- here we wish to explore 
the landscape through psychological and psychoanalytic ideas, and their relationship in conjunction 
with theories of art and aesthetics. Historical discourses relevant to landscape and nature are 
influential but as satellites, or points of illumination, not the cluster constituting the core of our 
ideas. 1 
The film presents temporal episodes of time in an unusual, unexpected way. The viewer’s temporal 
consciousness is heightened by the 30-second time-release shots presented in a dramatically 
quickened configuration. The extended periods of time over which the film was shot, their 
compressed character, the experience of mechanistically controlled time, and a temporal experience 
at variance with temporal reality, work to bring into awareness not just the passing of time, but 
different experiences of its passing. The visual dynamic of fast, processed time, takes place within 
the slower meta-time of nature over which humans have no control. Time and the way we 
                                                          
1
 The picturesque, used literally used to mean ‘like a picture’ is customarily a definition used in relation to landscape, but rooted in the 
early nineteenth century when it would have carried suggestions not simply of mirroring but of compositional harmony, and the 
refinement of nature by art. Development of these concepts would detract and limit the scope of the paper. Equally, romanticism’s 
relationship with the picturesque provides an extra twist in the direction of Nature as a source of moral and spiritual uplift, but leads us in 
another direction. The sublime, its origins in Burke, then Kant, and more recently in postmodernism, postmodernity (or Pomo theory) as a 
historical (political, economic, social, aesthetic) condition, represents fundamentally a reaction against the ideas of the Enlightenment 
central to the historical development of views core to Modernism (Novitz 2001), theories of no particular relevance to the paper. 
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endeavour to control it is related to functionality, to wellbeing and to health. The film presents 
alternative temporal modes, suggesting the way humans live in time is in part constructed, self-
constructed, more open to choice and to intervention.  
The presentation of unusual viewing positions, from fixed viewpoints, over a long period, provides 
images available for an unusual degree of scrutiny or attention. The three viewpoints are 
experienced concurrently, synchronised across three screens occupying the full height and length of 
the gallery walls. This emphasis highlights perceptual experience over physical encountering, a 
device that makes prominent subjective experiencing. Rather than a direct physical encounter, visual 
representation has been offered by art from Lascaux onwards, offering perhaps evolutionary, 
political or social advantages. A key concern is to enhance the possibility for sensory perception, 
disengaged from bodily and behavioural imperatives. A viewer, not physically tied into a direct, 
motivated or practical response to the object is afforded more freedom to imagine, to contemplate, 
and to experiment. The methods used, the organisational structures involved in the representational 
process, make it possible to engender a reflective interaction, involving perceptions and 
interpretations. These, we argue can be translated into emotions, principally behaviours and 
emotional expressions, thoughts, feelings, and mental states. 
The intention of the film is to challenge the viewer’s routine spectatorial stance, and to intervene 
within customary ways of looking at landscape, thus enabling an alternative engagement. The viewer 
is encouraged to develop a more contemplative, reflective, and interpretive relationship, that 
enhances intimacy with what is viewed, and cultivates an awareness of mental and emotional 
processes, or thoughts and states, what Allen and Fonagy et al term ‘mentalising’ in relation to what 
is experienced. The concept of mentalising originates in psychology, and has wide clinical application 
in psychopathology.  It is used to describe interactions between people, thus illustrated by Allen: 
‘while interacting, each person remains attentive to mental states, holding the other person’s mind 
in mind as well as their own’ (Allen 2006: p.7).  Mental health practitioners treat individuals with 
impaired mentalising capacity, often a consequence of childhood problems or personality disorders. 
Here, the idea of mentalisation is realigned from people, its usual context, to include nature, present 
as a quasi-person with whom the viewer interacts. For the purposes of this paper, the terms 
landscape and nature are used synonymously. Nature is presented neither as nature in itself, nor as 
wholly mental; it participates in both mind and nature.  
The experience of having emotions belongs to the human world; the film seeks to coax a range of 
emotions into greater awareness through a particular presentation of natural phenomena. The 
properties of what is seen are invested with aesthetic appearances intended to shift their register 
from the cognitive, a literal recognition of the phenomena represented, into an ‘expressivist’ 
appreciation located within the perceptual realm of the individual (Rose 2001: p.150). The key 
notion of expressivism is the idea that human beings are the unique locus of meaning and value, and 
that through imagination and feeling these are brought into realisation, termed by Charles Taylor as 
the act of ‘articulating what we find within us’ (Taylor 1989: p.370). In presenting natural 
phenomena intended for their register within an expressivist, formal dimension, to be ‘felt’ as 
colour, light, shade, and metaphor, the film has intentions comparable with those of abstract 
expressionism; emotions are introjected, but not attached to specific representation or narrative. 
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In becoming meaningful, nature enters into a relationship with the viewer, becoming subject to the 
externalisation of aspects of the psyche. The task for the viewer is to grasp and comprehend what 
has been externalised. The film, in its presentation of nature and concurrently the demand asked of 
the viewer echoes a psychotherapeutic intervention, able to yield, through the process of 
mentalising an empathic connection between the viewer and nature, beneficial to the individual, 




The well-known distinction within consciousness between “I” and “Me” is relevant to our project. “I” 
refers to a subjective sense of the self as a thinker and agent, and “Me”, to the objective sense of 
the self, constituting one’s self-image or self-concept (William James 1880, 1892). “Me” is regarded 
as the mental representation, and “I” as the quintessential self-agent that makes sense of 
experience, organises memories into coherent timelines, or self-narratives, and generally supports 
the process whereby lived experience is translated into a sense of unique self-identity (Mandler 
1985). The development of greater cognitive capacity through mentalising, defined as making sense 
of experience, rather than merely being conscious of observable phenomena can continue to be 
enhanced by people throughout their lives.2  
                                                          
2
 Neurocognitive science develops understanding of the mental processes that constitute an organisation of the self through research on 
the neural correlates of consciousness, in relation to neuroimaging studies. Work by neuroscientists, such as Tagini, Raffone and Srinivasan 
(Tagini, Raffone 2010) and (Raffone, Srinivasan 2010) provide a theory of understanding the self informed by the ways in which the brain 
experiences phenomena, properties of sensory experiences, or the concepts of the way things seem to us, and branches into areas of 
neurocognition characteristic of, for example, meditation experiences (or Buddhist and Zen practices) and the self-realisation developed 
by experts in these practices. Tagini, Raffone, and Srinivasan, and others use neuroscience to investigate meditation states to achieve an 
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Looking is a form of engagement that can involve mentalising in action, what Allen describes as ‘a 
wide range of cognitive operations pertaining to mental states, including attending, perceiving, 
recognizing, describing, interpreting, inferring, imagining, simulating, remembering, reflecting, and 
anticipating’ (Allen 2006: p.6.). Looking actively at nature in this mode provides an understanding of 
experiences related to emotional states, where the viewer discovers more about the self, others, 
their interrelationship and connectedness, and correspondingly builds an empathic relationship with 
the environment.  
The viewer’s capacity for mentalising provides the gateway for intrapsychic engagement. The film 
provides represented natural phenomena establishing a constellation of experiences through which 
a better understanding of the self, and concomitantly the self’s relationship to nature can be 
instituted. The process described is one of receiving thoughts and senses as they present themselves 
in a manner less detached, more empathic, and interpretive. This concept is important in relation to 
giving explanation to the reasoning operationalised in the visual images and the editing of the film 
footage, the receptive stance we envisage, and what the stance as an endeavour might achieve.  
The film presents vignettes, for example: an inversion of clouds is held swirling and captive in a 
coomb; a chasm is filled by darkness where shadows take hold and all light is dissolved; blackness is 
punctured by a pin prick of light to which the viewer’s eye fastens as to a life-raft, only to find it 
disappear and reappear far beyond the space imagined; dawn rises to be replaced by night, empty, 
or enlivened by stars; a mountain range is momentarily obtainable and unobtainable; shadows are 
cast, dark and fleeting across a snow-face; snow works its magic of transformation, the abyss is 
obscured and revealed, a place of beauty, denial, concealment.3 
When natural phenomena are viewed, as represented in the film, the viewer is provided with the 
fabric of visual suggestion intended for dynamic interpretation, which when related to the self 
through a process of mentalisation lends insight into emotional understanding.  Related to this is the 
process whereby the viewer engages with nature as a self-other. We are suggesting that natural 
phenomena are transmutable characterologically i.e. as recognisable self-states, in the broadest 
sense of the term. Thus, interpreted as something akin to recognisable felt states, or mental states, 
and potentially understood as emotions, they are translated into words and labelled as experiences, 
a process augmenting the capacity to mentalise. 
Mentalising as a concept is derived from the notion of ‘reflective functioning’ a term whose history 
and applications are beyond the scope of this paper. It should be made clear, however, how the 
term is used in this context. Freud (Freud 1911) describes the process of linking between primary 
and secondary processes from physical (unmediated, direct encounter) to psychic associative 
understanding and interpretation of internal states. From this initial concept the theme has been 
extensively developed in psychoanalytic literature, and theory of mind. Here we use the concept of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
increased understanding of cognitive and affective neuroplasticity (the brain's ability to reorganize itself by forming new neural 
connections throughout life), and attention and self-awareness for their clinical relevance. The investigation related to meditation has 
significant implications for understanding attention, consciousness, self-awareness, and empathy. Meditation-based mental training is not 
unlike the special kind of attention the film seeks to encourage. 
3 The images are symbiotic with notions explained by the ‘pathetic fallacy’, a term used to describe an allusion between one thing and 
another in ascribing human characteristics. The word 'pathetic' in this use is related to 'pathos' or ‘empathy’, or human capability of 
feeling, and is not depreciatory. John Ruskin used the term in 1856 in his book Modern Painters as a concept to which he was opposed. 
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reflective function employed by Peter Fonagy, Gyorgy Gergely, Elliot L. Jurist, and Mary Target 
(Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, Target 2004) that accords with its use by the many others engaged in 
developing notions associated with mentalisation, its theory and practice. Fonagy and Target use the 
term as ‘operationalisation of the psychological processes underlying the capacity to mentalise.’ 
Thus, reflective functioning is a form of mentalisation, and the dynamic activity of mentalising a 
psychological capacity embedded within the representation of the self and to the self (Fonagy and 
Target 1995, 1996; Target and Fonagy 1996). Reflective functioning is best understood as a tool by 
which an individual can provide credible interpretations of his or her own and others’ behaviour. The 
level of capacity is understood to stem from how the foundations of self-organisation are acquired, 
and respectively how mental states are then understood, and measured. Individuals vary across the 
spectrum in their ability to mentalise, but the capacity can be enhanced by anyone prepared to 
engage with its development, the projective endeavour of the film. 
An interpretive connection established between the individual and the landscape viewed, makes 
possible a reflective function that mentalises nature as self-mirrors, as potentially subjective 
interiors, providing the dynamic of perception. From a psychoanalytic developmental perspective, 
the concept is better articulated through an understanding of the development of emotional self-
awareness through affect-mirroring (Winnicott 1967).  Emotional mirroring, and the attachment 
style that evolves between the infant and the parent is identified as a core component in the 
development and organisation of the infant self, resulting in the adult psychological personality 
structure. The topic is the subject of a broad range of theoretical perspectives and approaches, and 
emotional mirroring is a central mechanism of therapeutic change in the context of psychotherapy. 
Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, and Target present what they term the social biofeedback model of affect 
mirroring specifying two modes of representational functioning in normal development, ‘psychic 
equivalence’ and ‘pretend’ modes of mentalising (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, Target 2004) which they 
develop from the original model posited by Gergely and Watson (1996). The first is interpreted much 
as Freud outlined as a primitive level of functioning where emotions, desires etc. are experienced as 
reality and not as mental states representing reality. Second, the ‘pretend’ mode involves awareness 
of the representational nature of experiences, made possible by the separation of mental 
representations involved in feeling from external reality. In the ‘pretend’ mode traumatic memories, 
threatening emotional impulses or unacceptable impulses and desires, can be safely activated and 
dealt with as their connection with reality has been suspended. In the ‘pretend’ mode experiences 
and thoughts are repeatedly reflected, or emotionally mirrored, enabling an individual to look into 
the shadows, the trauma, and tragedy. For the individual it is thus reintrojected and used as a 
representation within thinking. In relation to the film we present, this odd and interesting idea is 
that the right kind of ‘pretend’ opens the possibility of an emotionally potent but bearable reality. 
Pretend is not about fantasy or delusion. The film provides visual images with capacity to serve as 
emotional mirrors, but as representations, artifices, rather than ‘realities’. 
It may seem paradoxical to propose an artificial engagement with the natural in order to arrive at a 
greater understanding of nature, in both the human, self-organisational, material, and 
environmental sense. Yet the film provides an aesthetic environment in which the viewer is invited 
to adopt a reflective, and interpretive stance provoked by the unnaturalness of the nature 
represented, in the sense that it is a photographic equivalent of nature, not nature itself. The 
method suggests that a deliberate break from ‘nature’ is required to arrive at better understanding. 
We consider the stimulation of the required reflective process can better be augmented by the 
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artifice constructed, in the sense that ‘the non identical replica updates and problematises the 
original’ (Mukherjee 2005).  In other words, the film presents nature as aesthetically invested and 
technically orchestrated using processes, with an end in view: to establish in the viewer the capacity 
to experience the relationship between human beings and nature, to develop better self-realisation 
and definitions of the self, and to bring into recognition other ways of seeing. The film provides 
space for changes in perception and characteristic acts. In this sense, the film replays an original 
rupture within nature, which marks the appearance of the ‘human’. 
We have established that there are a variety of ways of seeing something like an Alpine landscape, 
some predominantly instrumental, some merely practical, some aesthetic. A landscape viewed by 
principally economically driven imperatives establishes a relationship engaged in its surveillance, 
potential exploitation, and utilisation. People needing to move physically through the landscape 
must be vigilant in assessing the terrain and conditions. Another modality of attention is by those 
seeking aesthetic fulfilment, including engagement with the landscape in search of beauty in order 
to feel uplifted, or ‘better’. The paper does not seek to condemn these modes of viewing; they are 
sometimes necessary, required, and routinely innocent. Tourism, following conflict or natural 
disaster can be very effective in restructuring damaged economies, communities, and infrastructure.  
This project presents another way of looking, mediated through artistic engagement, and is seeking 
certain outcomes made specific in the paper. 
The idea of bringing into consciousness awareness of how one looks reverberates across a variety of 
discourses, not least Kant’s idea that experience (of the one real world with the kind of universal 
properties assumed by science: identity, intelligibility, causality etc.) is the product of receptive and 
active faculties. A stress on a strategy of ‘defamiliarisation’, leading to an awareness of how we see, 
has been present from early Modernism. The difference between these ideas, and the intervention 
sought here, is our interest in the paradox that the very elements that invite a routine response are 
designed to trigger something else. How is this to be achieved? A process of psychotherapeutic 
intervention through mentalising in action is central to the paper. The viewer is presented with the 
white of a snow-capped mountain range, spin-drift blown sidelong into a cloudless blue beyond, 
pink-glowing snow slopes reflecting shades of the descending sun, the sheerness, verticality and 
jaggedness of mountains. These phenomena pull the viewer into familiar modes of looking, 
predetermined and confined by parameters of learned expedience. However, these elements can 
equally generate a perceptual relationship that facilitates reflective viewing. Undoubtedly, this 
necessitates a commitment in time problematical within our modern pace of life, or goal directed 
lives.  
A full engagement with nature demands mental work, mentalising in action. Work is not usually 
associated with looking at nature, or landscape, or images of landscape. We expect to absorb it, 
drink it in, and soak it up. But work is required if we are to become properly aware of our viewing, 
the thoughts and feelings associated with it, and the ways in which these thoughts are perceived, 
and understood. The content of the film, the specificity of its signifiers, its images, its temporal, 
technological and methodological organisation, and system of synchronism and acoustic variance 
are designed to increase awareness. The time compressed in the film and the multiple viewing 
positions make it easier to achieve a contemplative viewpoint, but the project sets out to confront 
the viewer with the complexity of mentalising, the purposes of which have been explored, but will 
now be developed. 
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To put this notion in context it is necessary to explore the idea of mentalising in relation to a general 
theory of art as a particular kind of representation. Plato argued that for the good of the Republic, 
not only should certain kinds of art be banished, in essence art that ‘carries people away’, but that 
certain forms of art should be retained, those he considered benign with respect to the ideal. He 
argued against art that makes citizens less governable, both as citizens but also at the internal level 
of conflicting drives and interests. From Plato, through Nietchze to Freud, the overarching theme is 
one of art and life; is art good for life, what kind of art, what kind of life? The world becomes a 
liveable place through a process of individuation, but this must be through what Freud called the 
‘reality principle’, the separation of ego and world, the "I" and the "other." There is the issue of who 
I am, as a being, and what the world in which I must live is like. Once the infant’s journey of 
understanding has begun, the self begins to know the world and to have ideas about its structure, its 
objects, and governing rules; the self as a being beginning to know the world is also beginning to 
know the self. For Nietchze, the creation of self-and-world creates a problem if it ignores all aspects 
of the true universal reality, which must involve both the ideal in Plato’s terms, but also tragedy. 
Nietchze proposes that if humans deny the tragic aspects of life they will fail and fall ill. As time 
passes, the accumulation of denied experience assumes larger proportions than the self is able, 
healthily, to integrate within the psyche. This is the dark side of reality. That which we ignore or 
actively repress is what Carl Jung called the ‘shadow’ (C. Jung 1938), Jung believed that if the shadow 
is ignored it eventually ‘strikes us when we're looking the other way.’ The dark side will make its 
presence apparent and force us to confront whatever we have tried to shut out of our lives, or 
striven, overbearingly to control. Such defence mechanisms are required, put in place by the self in 
order to make it easier to operate within the constructs of a liveable world, but equally, they 
establish the self as profoundly vulnerable.  
Nietzsche develops his notion of tragedy out of a relationship between the Apollonian ideal and 
Dionysian drives. For Nietzsche, human health lies in art, tragic art in particular; it is the dark 
metaphysical drive that has the capacity to resolve existence, aesthetically: 
‘That life is really so tragic would least of all explain the origin of an art form -assuming that 
art is not merely imitation of the reality of nature but rather a metaphysical supplement of the 
reality of nature, placed beside it for its overcoming. The tragic myth, too, in so far as it belongs to 
arts at all, participates fully in this metaphysical intention of art to transfigure’ (Nietzsche 1871: p. 
140).  
Nature represented as a quasi-self establishes an interlocutor encouraging the spectator to be alive 
to the sensory stimuli, the immediacy of perception, and reflective experience. Nature provides the 
mirror through which the transference is reflected, enabling us to see ourselves more clearly.  
To conclude, through processes of reflective functioning, mentalising connects sensory and auditory 
experienced phenomena into interpreted perceptions that have metaphysical and metaphorical 
potential, or meanings that can be transcribed into self-states, providing for the self to bring into 





The viewer responsive to the artistic stimuli will observe closely, and on one level will enjoy the 
process of inspection because from the images will achieve greater understanding of life and what is 
involved in living: the inexorability of the passing of time, mortality, the serious, the melancholic, the 
repressed, the sad and the profound, the suddenness of change, the need to adjust, chance, fear, 
light and hope, in short the gamut of emotions involved in being alive. And yet the artifice, the 
aesthetic construct, presents life as not for real, but as a shadow play that the viewer recognises. 
The parts of living and suffering, of joy and happiness, is experienced, but linked with a sense of 
illusion. Thus, the aesthetic artifice of the film provides a pretend mode through which the individual 
is able to attenuate the intensity of the emotion whilst staying with the feeling. 
The film invites the viewer to occupy an attitude of reflection in relation to the nature of the 
landscapes, and the elements presented. The paper proposes that this can contribute towards an 
improved empathic understanding of the relationship between human beings and the natural world, 
advantageous for our care for the environment and for our awareness and understanding of our 
personal identity and psychic wellbeing, and our relationships between the self and others, the self 
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